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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies competition in the pharmaceutical and airline industries,
focusing on two types of firm conduct: advertising and pricing. In the following
chapters, I apply econometric models to novel datasets to study important policy
questions in these industries.
The first chapter studies the effects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTC)
on the market shares of new branded prescription drugs. This chapter contributes to
the debate in the literature over whether advertising is more advantageous to entrants,
who might use it to gain traction in the market, or to incumbents, who might use it
to persuade consumers away from the entrants. Moreover, the permissibility of DTC
for prescription drugs is a contentious policy issue. I focus on Type 2 diabetes drugs
because this category has seen a wave of brand entry in the last decade. To account
for the endoegeneity of advertising, I use political advertising as an instrument. I find
that DTC has a business-stealing effect on the margin. In order to assess the effects
of a counterfactual policy which bans DTC, I estimate a discrete-choice model of
drug demand by diabetes patients. I find that new brands would have lost significant
market share under a DTC ban, and that patients would have substituted to cheaper
drugs. These results suggest that the desirability of DTC hinges on whether the
therapeutic benefits of new drugs outweigh their higher prices.
The second chapter extends the study of DTC to an additional element of firm
strategy: pricing. High drug prices are a cause for great concern in the United States,
particularly for diabetes drugs such as insulin. The effect of advertising on prices
is theoretically ambiguous, however. This chapter studies the question empirically
in the market for diabetes drugs. I find that the marginal effect of DTC is to
lower prescription drug prices. This is explained by business-stealing – DTC makes
consumers more willing to substitute between drugs, which limits drug manufacturers’
ability to set high prices. To study the effects of a ban on DTC, I augment the demand
model of the first chapter with a model of drug price negotiations between insurers
and drug manufacturers. I find that both higher and lower average prices are possible
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after a ban. I also find that the results of the first chapter are robust to allowing for
price changes – market shares of new brands fall in both cases. These results show
that price adjustments should be taken into account in the policy debate around
DTC.
The third chapter, with Paul Brehm and Andrew Usher, examines the relationship
between airfares and oil prices in the Australian airline industry. We find that
pass-through exceeds 100% on average and increases with competition. We also find
evidence of heterogeneity in pass-through across different products – business class
pass-through is lower than economy, while non-stop flights have higher pass-through
rates than flights with stops. These results reflect a tension between second-degree
price discrimination and pricing higher to high-value consumers. Heterogeneity in
consumers’ willingness to pay and the existence of products targeted at different
consumers are key to explaining these results. Our findings have important implications
for environmental policy in industries with imperfect competition and differentiated
products. In particular, they suggest that a carbon tax on the airline industry would
be shifted onto consumers to a great extent.
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CHAPTER I
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and New Drug
Diffusion
1.1 Introduction
Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTC) is an important feature of many industries,
but is nowhere more controversial than in the market for prescription drugs. DTC
can affect drug choices if patients ask for a specific drug by name, which doctors
report causes them to feel pressure to prescribe that drug (FDA, 2015). Supporters
of DTC say that this empowers patients to be more involved in their health care and
have more informed discussions with their physicians. Detractors argue that such
advertising biases patient decisions and contributes to the high cost of health care in
the US (FDA, 2015). Indeed, the US is an outlier among the world as one of only
two countries (along with New Zealand) to permit DTC for prescription drugs.
The role of DTC is particularly interesting in the context of new products. On
this question, the economics literature is split between entry-deterring and pro-competitive
views of advertising.1 The former view suggests that advertising is used by incumbents
to create barriers to entry (Braithwaite, 1928). The latter view argues instead that
entrants can advertise to gain traction in the market and become stronger competitors
to the incumbents (Telser, 1964).2 As theory delivers ambiguous predictions, this
paper empirically studies how DTC affects the market shares of new prescription
drug brands. This question has not been addressed by the literature, yet it is highly
relevant as several drug categories are seeing entry by multiple brands, many of which
1See Bagwell (2007) for a nice summary of this literature.
2These arguments apply to advertising in general. Drugs are advertised through multiple
channels, of which DTC is but one (albeit an important and controversial one). Since this paper
focuses exclusively on DTC, I will use the terms “DTC” and “advertising” interchangeably.
1
advertise. The context I study is the market for drugs used to treat Type 2 diabetes,
which has seen a wave of brand entry and intense advertising over the past decade.
I use claims data from the employer-sponsored health insurance market provided
by Truven and advertising data from Kantar Media. I focus exclusively on television
advertising in this paper, as that is the most important DTC channel for anti-diabetic
drugs. Beyond answering questions about the nature of advertising, this setting is
important from a public health standpoint as diabetes becomes more prevalent.3
To better understand how advertising operates in this market, I start with
a regression analysis of the marginal effects of advertising on drug sales. I allow for
spillover effects of a given drug’s rivals’ ads onto sales of that drug. Since firms choose
advertising strategically, it is likely to be correlated with demand shocks unobservable
to researchers. I follow Sinkinson and Starc (2018) in using political advertising
to instrument for drug advertising. During election years, certain “battleground”
states receive high levels of political advertising, which exogenously displace drug
advertising. This identifies the effects of own advertising. To identify spillover effects,
I take advantage of the fact that some drugs do not advertise. These drugs should
only receive the spillover effect and so can be used for identification. I find that
advertising has strong business-stealing effects – a drug’s own advertising increases
its sales, while advertising by its rivals decreases its sales.
However, the policy of interest that would put the US in line with most other
countries is a ban on DTC. To study this, I estimate a discrete-choice model of
patient drug demand that accounts for endogeneity of both drug price and advertising.
Political ads are again used to identify the effects of drug advertising. The model
delivers three main results. First, consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Shapiro,
2018), DTC has positive spillover effects. Second, when DTC is banned, consumers
substitute to less expensive drugs on average (holding drug prices fixed). Finally,
when DTC is banned, new drugs lose significant market share. This final result lends
support to the argument of Telser (1964) that entrants can use advertising to gain
traction in the market.
This paper makes several contributions. First, I add to the literature on new
drug entry by focusing on new brands. The previous literature (e.g. Scott Morton,
1999; Scott Morton, 2000) largely studies entry of generics, which do not advertise
and so do not create the issues discussed above. Ellison and Ellison (2011) study how
3About 1.5 million new cases of diabetes occur every year in the US (ADA, 2018).
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brands use advertising strategically when faced with generic entry. It is important to
study competition between brands due to the length of drug patents, which prevent
generics from entering for a long time; and because branded entrants, unlike generics,
might use advertising to gain traction in the market. A large literature in marketing
studies learning about new brands (e.g. Chintagunta et al., 2012) but generally in
the context of detailing (i.e. marketing to physicians) rather than DTC. Previous
work has shown that firms’ detailing and DTC strategies can be quite different
(Shapiro, 2018). Moreover, the marketing literature is more concerned with strategies
of individual firms rather than the market-wide effects of policies like a ban on DTC.
This paper also adds to the recent literature that uses natural experiments
to identify the effects of DTC. Shapiro (2018) finds spillover effects of DTC and
Sinkinson and Starc (2018) find business-stealing between brands. Shapiro (2018)
uses boundary discontinuities between DMAs to identify spillovers while Sinkinson
and Starc (2018) use a combination of two natural experiments. The approach taken
here is to use drugs that do not advertise to identify spillovers. This is arguably
more general than both approaches above – unlike Shapiro (2018), the results apply
away from the boundaries; unlike Sinkinson and Starc (2018), researchers can use this
approach without needing multiple natural experiments.
Finally, the focus on anti-diabetic drugs is important from a policy and public
health standpoint. This market has been understudied in the health economics and
marketing literatures – the only other paper I am aware of is Guo et al. (2017).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 discusses institutional details of
the anti-diabetics market, Section 1.3 explains the data and descriptive analysis,
Section 1.4 introduces the structural model, Section 1.5 discusses estimation of the
model, Section 1.6 shows results, Section 1.7 discusses counterfactuals, and Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Empirical Setting
1.2.1 Type 2 Diabetes
Type 2 diabetes mellitus is a chronic, progressive disease characterized by
insulin resistance. Insulin is the hormone produced and used by the body that allows
cells to absorb glucose from the bloodstream (e.g. after a meal). In Type 2 diabetes,
the body’s cells develop resistance to insulin, and/or the pancreas does not produce
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insulin in sufficient amounts. This makes blood glucose levels too high, which leads to
dangerous consequences such as kidney failure, blindness, and amputations. In 2015,
30.3 million Americans (9.4% of the population) had diabetes of some kind. Type
2 diabetes accounts for 90–95% of cases (CDC, 2017). Both genetic and lifestyle
factors contribute to developing Type 2 diabetes. Historically, it mainly affected
adults, but it increasingly affects children as rates of childhood obesity continue to
grow. Because of the disease’s link to unhealthy lifestyles, public health experts fear
that its prevalence will rise. In 2012, costs of diabetes were estimated to be $245
billion in the US (CDC, 2017).
1.2.2 The Market for Treatments
Treatment of Type 2 diabetes proceeds in stages. Depending on the pathophysiology
of the disease for a given individual, the first step might be diet and exercise. The first
medicine used is generally Metformin, which is available as a low-cost generic. There
is a consensus among medical professionals that Metformin should be the first line of
defense against Type 2 diabetes. While the patient is being treated, blood glucose
levels are monitored regularly. If Metformin fails to control blood glucose levels,
another medicine is added. The American Diabetes Association (ADA) recommends
that this second medicine come from one of six classes: sulfonylurea (SU), TZD,
DPP-4 inhibitor, SGLT-2 inhibitor, GLP-1 receptor agonist, and basal insulin (Bailey,
2013). This is the stage of treatment I focus on, as this is where branded drugs
become important. Unlike with Metformin, there is no clear consensus on which of
these classes is most effective (Inzucchi et al., 2015). If dual therapy with Metformin
fails to control blood glucose levels after a period of time, the doctor can move to
triple therapy. Eventually, insulin therapy will be initiated.4
Of the above drug classes, SUs and TZDs are the oldest with several generic
options. The latter four classes have seen substantial new brand entry over the past
decade (see Table 1.1). SGLT2 in particular is an all-new class that started with the
introduction of Invokana in 2013. Because the relative efficacies of the various drugs
are not yet well-established, doctors are encouraged to tailor treatments to individual
cases, taking into account patient preferences even over factors like costs. Doctors
can in principle switch patients between any of the six classes. Given the lack of
4Frequently, patients in insulin therapy also take one or even two non-insulin drugs from the
aforementioned classes. As I discuss below, when constructing my sample I select those patients that
take only one non-Metformin drug in a month, making it unlikely that they are in this advanced
stage of therapy.
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scientific consensus, DTC might play an important role in shaping preferences.
Pharmaceuticals are some of the most heavily advertised products in the
United States, and within pharmaceuticals, diabetes drugs are a heavily advertised
category. Drug manufacturers spent approximately $1.8 billion on national DTC
television ads for diabetes drugs between 2009 and 2017 (author’s calculations). In
a dynamic category like this, advertising could be a valuable tool for new entrants
to raise awareness of their products and more effectively compete. On the other
hand, incumbents could use advertising combatively to prevent entrants from gaining
traction.
1.2.3 Employer-Sponsored Health Plans
The context for my analysis is the employer-sponsored population. As of 2017,
about half of all Americans accessed health care through an employer-sponsored plan,
either directly or by virtue of being a spouse or dependent of someone on such a
plan (KFF, 2017). Large, self-insured employers offer their employees a selection of
plans (increasingly limited in recent years), possibly contracting with an insurance
company to administer the plans. Employers, or more likely the insurers they contract
with, also negotiate with health providers over terms of service (henceforth I will use
“insurers” to refer to this side of the market). Chapter II focuses more on this aspect
of the market.
1.3 Data
I utilize multiple data sources to answer the questions of interest. The period
of analysis is 2010-2017.
1.3.1 Pharmaceutical Claims
For information on prescription drugs, I use the Truven MarketScan Commercial
Claims and Encounters database. Truven contains data on medical claims for employees
at a sample of large US firms. For prescription drugs, the data show the national
drug code number of the drug purchased, the purchase date, the patient’s CBSA of
residence, the patient’s out-of-pocket price, and the amount paid by the insurer to
the health provider net of patient cost-sharing and third-party payments.
I first select pharmaceutical claims from the individuals in the Truven data
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age 18-64 who have been diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes.5 Unlike Type 2 diabetics,
Type 1 diabetics can only use insulin, so the other classes of drugs described above are
not true substitutes for them. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the two
groups. Diabetics use a variety of medical services to manage not only their diabetes,
but the various complications associated with the disease, such as blood pressure. I
select only the claims corresponding to diabetes medication.
As discussed above, diabetes treatment proceeds in stages. I focus on the
“dual therapy” stage, where patients take one drug in addition to Metformin after
Metformin alone stops working. Restricting attention to this stage of treatment allows
me to assume that patients choose only one drug from the six classes discussed above,
greatly simplifying the subsequent analysis. This stage of treatment also appears to
be the most important segment of the data. The majority of patients in the data
purchase one non-Metformin drug in a given month.6 Of these, the majority of
prescriptions are for a 30-day supply, which is what I focus on. To get the number
of products down to a reasonable size, I aggregate over generics of the same active
ingredients made by different companies, different delivery forms of the same drug,
and different dosages of the same drug. What is important for the analysis is how
advertising influences the choice of drug, while things like dosage and delivery form
are more idiosyncratic and depend on the specific pathophysiology of each individual
patient’s disease.
The data contain information on the portion of the drug price paid by the
patient and the portion paid by the insurer. I construct the patient’s out-of-pocket
price as the sum of the copay, coinsurance, and deductible. The deductible potentially
introduces complications because it creates a dynamic problem for the patient –
using medical services early in the year puts the patient closer to his or her cap and
decreases the expected cost of medical services later in the year. The literature has
found mixed results about whether patients actually consider this dynamic problem.7
In my context, I find that the vast majority of claims have no deductibles at all,
perhaps reflecting the generosity of these insurance plans or that these patients use
so many other medical services that they exceed the cap early. In any case, this makes
concerns about dynamic behavior less relevant.
5I thank Tanima Basu at IHPI for preparing this data for me.
6This is after dropping all claims for Metformin, which make up the vast majority of Type 2
diabetes-related claims.
7For example, see Aron-Dine et al. (2015) and Dalton et al. (2015).
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On the insurer side, the Truven data record how much the insurer reimbursed
the health provider (likely a pharmacy in this context) for the drug. I drop observations
where both the patient out-of-pocket price (as defined above) and the insurer reimbursement
are zero as likely being miscoded. I also drop outliers, defined as prices below the 1st
percentile or above the 99th percentile of the overall distributions of the constructed
out-of-pocket price and insurer reimbursement. For the subsequent analysis, all that
is important is the out-of-pocket price, as this paper focuses entirely on patients’ drug
choices. Chapter II discusses the reimbursement data in more detail.
1.3.2 Pharmaceutical Advertising
Advertising data come from Kantar Media. I observe the number of local
and national product-specific television ads monthly at the Designated Market Area
(DMA) level. Drug manufacturers use both local and national ads (Figure 1.1). For
this category, national ads are much more common, but certain DMAs see heavy local
advertising at certain times. Figure 1.2 plots total national advertising over time and
shows a clear upward trend.
Different firms appear to have different advertising strategies. Some brands
are advertised heavily, others sporadically, and others not at all.8 Furthermore,
at least some brands appear to advertise heavily not when they themselves are
first introduced but when other brands are introduced. The clearest cases of this
are Victoza and Januvia, whose advertising paths are shown in Figure 1.3. Both
incumbent drugs have sharp spikes in advertising around 2014, when several new
brands are introduced (Table 1.1). These facts all show that drug manufacturers use
advertising strategically. In particular, the cases of Victoza and Januvia suggest that
advertising may be used combatively by incumbents against entrants.
Previous work has shown that advertising can have “goodwill” effects that
persist and build over time. Firms do not necessarily advertise to boost demand at
any given time but to build up goodwill among consumers (Narayanan et al., 2005;
Shapiro, 2018). That is, advertising should be treated as a stock variable. Let ajmt
represent the number of ads for product j in market m and month t. The ad stock
8Generics are generally not advertised, but they are not an important factor in this market
beyond Metformin and the sulfonylureas.
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where τ is the first month product j advertised in market m and γ is a persistence
parameter. Following Narayanan et al. (2005), I calibrate γ to 0.7.9
The geographic market definition differs between the Kantar (DMA) and
Truven (CBSA) data. I use a crosswalk from the NBER to match the two. There
are 210 DMAs in the US, of which Kantar covers 101 (plus national advertising).
Furthermore, CBSAs are not an exhaustive geographic breakdown of the US. For
these two reasons, there will not be perfect overlap between the two data sources,
but there is a great deal of overlap. I am able to match 268 CBSAs to 100 DMAs.10
National ads are assigned to every DMA and are included in the ad stock measure
above.
1.3.3 Political Advertising
I follow Sinkinson and Starc (2018) in using political advertising as an instrument
for pharmaceutical advertising. The intuition is that political ads get preferential
treatment and so displace other kinds of ads exogenously in battleground states during
election years. Political ad data come from the Wesleyan Media Project which, in
partnership with Kantar, tracks all political ads in different kinds of elections (e.g.
presidential, federal Congressional, state, etc.).11 The data also contain the length of
the ad, which allows me to normalize to 30-second ads. Except for presidential ads,
these ads should largely shift local drug advertising.
1.3.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
The first column of Table 1.2 shows the results of a first-stage regression of log
anti-diabetic ad stock (as defined above) on log political ads (both in 100s). The unit
of observation is a product-DMA-month using the sample of DMAs that were matched
to the Truven data. The regression includes product, DMA, and year fixed effects. I
9I have advertising data starting in 2009, which I use in the construction of the ad stock variable
but not in the subsequent analysis. This mitigates concerns about an initial conditions problem. I
test a range of values for γ which all produce similar results.
10A small number of CBSAs cross different DMAs, which prevents me from assigning advertising
to them. I drop these CBSAs.
11Data from the 2016 presidential election were not available at the time of purchase.
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specifically test the intensive margin effect of political ads, i.e. the effect given that
a product has already chosen to advertise. The coefficient is highly significant. The
magnitude implies that a 10% increase in political ads lead to a 0.22% decrease in
drug advertising. This magnitude is smaller than what is found in Sinkinson and
Starc (2018), possibly reflecting the relative importance of national advertising in
this category, which the instrument does not shift as much. In the second column
of Table 1.2, I find that political ads displace pharmaceutical ads at a point in time
(i.e. ad flow) as well, reducing concerns that drug manufacturers are simply re-timing
their ads to avoid the political ads.
In order to evaluate the marginal effects of advertising in this market, I run a
two-stage least squares regression of the quantity of drug j sold in market m and time
t on own and rival advertising (both using the stock measure defined above) using
the political ad instrument to account for the endogeneity of drug advertising:
ln(Qjmt) = βa ln(1 + Adjmt) + βs ln(1 + Ad−jmt) + αXjmt + εjmt (1.2)
Here, the unit of observation is a product-CBSA-month.12 Rival advertising
might be important because of spillover effects. These are identified due to the
presence of drugs that do not advertise, meaning they only receive spillovers. I interact
political advertising with an indicator for no pharmaceutical advertising to form an
instrument for spillovers. Though the decision not to advertise is an endogenous
choice, recall that the measure of advertising used here is the ad stock. In order for a
particular drug’s ad stock to be zero in a particular DMA-month, that drug cannot
have advertised in that DMA and cannot have advertised nationally at any point
up to and including that month. Such a decision is less likely to be influenced by
local demand shocks and is more likely to be part of a larger strategy by the drug
manufacturer. Product, CBSA, and year fixed effects (X) are also included.
The two-stage least squares regression in Table 1.3 shows that advertising has
strong business-stealing effects. A 10% increase in product j’s advertising leads to
2.9% higher sales in a given CBSA-month, while a 10% increase in advertising by
product j’s rivals leads to a loss in sales of 1.7%. The signs are consistent with what
is found in Sinkinson and Starc (2018).
12Recall that a DMA is a geographic measure for media markets. Advertising does not vary
within DMA, which is why the first stage was done at the DMA level, but the 2SLS is done at the
CBSA level.
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While this regression provides useful information, there are a few limitations.
The coefficients of the quantity regressions are a composite of business-stealing and
market expansion, though it seems the former outweighs the latter. A structural
model is required to disentangle these effects. Moreover, the regressions do not
capture the policy of interest – a marginal increase in advertising could have different
effects from a total ban on advertising. A ban is not observed in the data, so again
a model is required.
1.4 Model
I estimate a structural model of demand for anti-diabetic drugs in order to
perform the main counterfactual of interest: a ban on direct-to-consumer advertising.
Consumers choose the prescription drug that maximizes utility. Physicians are assumed
to be perfect agents for consumers; this is supported by the ADA heavily emphasizing
that physicians should take patient preferences into account when making prescribing
decisions.13 Consumer i receives utility from drug j in market (CBSA) m, month t,
and year y given by:
uijmt = βa ln(1 +Adjmt) +βs ln(1 +Ad−jmt)−ακjmypjmy +αj +αm +αy + ξjmt + εijmt
(1.3)
where Adjmt is drug j’s advertising stock (as defined above), and Ad−jmt represents
rival drugs’ total advertising stock in marketm and month t. The term κjmy represents
the coinsurance rate for drug j in market m for year y. Similarly, pjmy is the
negotiated drug price between the insurer and drug manufacturer. The product
of these two terms thus corresponds to the out-of-pocket price for drug j faced
by consumers in market m and year y. The notation reflects the assumption that
prices are negotiated and coinsurance rates are set yearly (see Chapter II for further
explanation). αj, αm, and αy are product, market, and year fixed effects, respectively.
ξjmt is a product-market-month unobservable, and εijmt = εigmt + (1 − λg)εijmt is a
“nested logit” error. The nest parameter λg controls substitution within group g vs.
across groups. If λg is zero, the model collapses to a simple logit. As λg approaches
one, there is less within-group variance in utility across products, i.e. only the groups
matter. As is standard, I assume that εijmt is distributed iid type 1 extreme value.
13However, physician agency could enter the model in a reduced-form way through the spillover
term. Suppose, for example, that a patient asks his or her doctor for a particular advertised drug,
but the doctor ultimately prescribes a different drug. This type of behavior would be interpreted
by the model as a spillover effect of advertising by the drug that the patient initially requested.
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The utility of the outside option j = 0 is normalized to zero: ui0mt = εi0mt. I define
the outside option as choosing a sulfonylurea. In the medical literature, this class is
recommended if cost is a concern to the patient (Raz, 2013).14
It is convenient to define the mean utility of product j in market m at time t
as:
δjmt = βa ln(1 +Adjmt) + βs ln(1 +Ad−jmt)−ακjmypjmy +αj +αm +αy + ξjmt (1.4)














where Jgmt is the set of products belonging to group g in market m and time t. The
first term on the right-hand side is the probability of choosing product j given a
choice of group g. The second term is the probability of choosing group g.












1−λg sj|gmt − sjmt
)






, if j and k are in the same nest
ακkmtpkmtskmt, otherwise
(1.6)
where sj|gmt is the within-group share of j and sgmt is the share of group g. These
expressions make clear that insurance dampens consumer price sensitivities by exactly
the coinsurance rate κ.
1.5 Estimation









1{j ∈ g}λg ln(sj|gmt) + βa ln(1 + Adjmt) + βs ln(1 + Ad−jmt)
− ακjmypjmy + αj + αm + αy + ξjmt
(1.7)
14Sulfonylureas are largely consumed as generics. The cost to both patients and insurers is fairly
low, therefore for simplicity I assume that the price of the outside option is zero.
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where s0mt is the share of the outside option. I use separate nests for insulins and
non-insulins. Conveniently, this demand system can be estimated with a linear IV. I
use only the CBSA-months that have at least 150 sales (including the outside option)
to reduce noise in the market shares. Because prices are assumed to be negotiated
yearly, I take average prices in the Truven data for both patients and insurers at the
CBSA-product-year level. See Chapter II for more detail on the price variables.
The endogenous variables in this equation are the within-group share (sj|gmt),
out-of-pocket price (κjmypjmy), and advertising (Adjmt, Ad−jmt), all of which might
be correlated with unobserved demand shocks ξjmt. I instrument for the price of
product j in market m using the Hausman instrument, i.e. the average out-of-pocket
price of product j in all other markets besides m. This instrument is valid if product
j’s price in other markets is related to product j’s marginal cost, and thus price in
market m, but unrelated to demand shocks in market m. The well-known threat to
the validity of this instrument is if there are factors that affect demand in all markets
simultaneously, such as a national advertising campaign. I explicitly control for this
particular factor. As is standard in the literature, I instrument for the within-group
share with the number of products in each group; when new products enter, this
mechanically shifts within-group shares.
As discussed in Section 1.3, I instrument for drug advertising with political ads,
following Sinkinson and Starc (2018). Certain battleground states become flooded
with political ads during election years, exogenously displacing drug ads and permitting
identification of βa. Identification of βs comes from the fact that there are drugs in
the data that do not advertise. These drugs only receive the spillover effect and so can
be used for identification – i.e. when Adjmt = 0, the only way advertising can have an
effect on drug j is through Ad−jmt. As in Section 1.3, I instrument for spillovers by
interacting political ads with an indicator for zero ad stock by drug j. As before, the
decision not to advertise can reasonably be assumed independent of ξjmt because the
instrument requires the ad stock to be zero, meaning the drug cannot have advertised
in market m at or before month t and cannot have advertised nationally at or before
month t. This decision is less likely to be correlated with a local demand shock.
1.6 Results
Demand estimates are shown in Table 1.4. All estimates are significant. Price
and own ads have the expected sign. Consistent with Shapiro (2018), spillovers are
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estimated to be positive. The reduced form regression in Table 1.3 masked this fact, as
it appears business-stealing is stronger on net. Both nest parameters are around 0.5,
showing that within-group substitution is important. Average own-price elasticities
are around –2 and similar for insulins and non-insulins. Consumers are not overly
price sensitive, as might be expected since they are insured, but the availability of
many substitutes and relatively high prices appear to make them more elastic than
in some other contexts, e.g. Grennan et al. (2018).15
1.7 Counterfactuals
Given the structural parameters, we can now simulate how consumer choices
would adjust in response to a ban on DTC. In all counterfactual scenarios, I hold
drug prices fixed; Chapter II considers the more general case when prices are also
allowed to adjust. I drop all firms’ advertising to zero and compute new equilibrium
quantities using the demand system. Figure 1.4 plots quantity-weighted average
yearly prices.16 This counterfactual provides insight into the “partial equilibrium”
effect of advertising. It shows that advertising creates a preference for more expensive
products – consumers substitute to cheaper products on average when there is no
advertising and prices are held constant, conditional on choosing the inside option.
The decrease in average price in each year ranges from 0-6%, with the larger reductions
coming in the later years of the sample. This is consistent with the fact that more
products are introduced – and more advertising is used – in this part of the sample.
Figure 1.5 shows that two entrants in the SGLT2 class would have had lower
market shares on average without the ability to advertise. These results show that
the entrants were able to use advertising to gain traction in the market, despite the
seemingly combative advertising of incumbents (see Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.6 shows evidence of spillover effects; Humalog, a major insulin that
does not advertise at all in this period, loses market share relative to baseline when
advertising is banned. Figure 1.7 shows that without advertising, more consumers
would switch to the outside option. This is consistent with DTC having spillover
effects that expand the market. Without DTC, consumers would utilize low-cost
generic sulfonylureas to a greater extent.
15Chapter II, which uses the demand model of this paper along with a model of insurer-drug
manufacturer bargaining, shows that the model fits the data well.
16The “baseline” series and the baseline prices used to construct the “CF” series come from the
more general model in Chapter II.
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1.8 Conclusion
The effects of DTC on the market for anti-diabetic drugs are nuanced. Using
political advertising as an instrument for drug advertising, two-stage least squares
estimates show that the marginal effect of DTC is business-stealing. To study the
effects of a ban on DTC, this paper estimates a structural model of anti-diabetic drug
demand. A partial equilibrium counterfactual shows that DTC creates a preference
for more expensive products. A ban on DTC lowers the market shares of entrants in
the new SGLT2 class. Despite incumbents using DTC in the face of new brand entry,
entrants were able to use DTC to gain traction in the market. However, a ban on
DTC would also increase the use of low-cost generics. Taken together, these results
suggest that DTC creates a tradeoff between encouraging consumption of new drugs
vs. substituting to cheaper drugs, including generics.
There are several avenues for future research. All of the results of this paper
assume that prices are held fixed. Chapter II extends these results to the case where
prices are allowed to adjust after a ban on advertising. Future work could also attempt
to quantify the therapeutic benefits of new anti-diabetic drugs for patients to shed
more light on the tradeoff discussed above. Given that the anti-diabetic category
is fast-growing with unclear relative efficacies of different drugs, modeling patients’
learning process could yield valuable insights. Expanding the analysis to other drug
categories would also be interesting.
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Figure 1.1: Total National and Local Advertising, Anti-Diabetic Drugs
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Figure 1.2: Monthly National Advertising, Anti-Diabetic Drugs
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Figure 1.4: Average Drug Prices after a Ban on DTC
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Figure 1.6: Effect of DTC on Non-Advertised Incumbent
Notes: The graph shows average market shares of Humalog, a popular insulin that did not engage
in DTC television advertising during the sample period.
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Figure 1.7: Effect of DTC on Outside Option Shares
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Table 1.1: Anti-Diabetic Drug Approval Dates, Advertised Brands
Brand Name Manufacturer Approval Date Drug Class
Avandia GlaxoSmithKline 5/25/1999 TZD
Novolog Novo Nordisk 6/7/2000 Insulin
Levemir Novo Nordisk 6/16/2005 Insulin
Januvia Merck 10/17/2006 DPP4
Onglyza AstraZeneca 6/31/2009 DPP4
Victoza Novo Nordisk 1/26/2010 GLP1
Invokana Johnson & Johnson 3/29/2013 SGLT2
Farxiga AstraZeneca 1/8/2014 SGLT2
Tanzeum GlaxoSmithKline 4/15/2014 GLP1
Afrezza Sanofi 6/27/2014 Insulin
Jardiance Boehringer Ingelheim 8/1/2014 SGLT2
Trulicity Eli Lilly 9/18/2014 GLP1
Toujeo Sanofi 2/25/2015 Insulin
Tresiba Novo Nordisk 9/25/2015 Insulin
Table 1.2: Political Ads Displace Anti-Diabetic Drug Ads
ln(1+Adjmt) ln(1+ajmt)




Notes: Dependent variable is log ad stock in first column, log ad flow in second column. All ad units
are measured in 100s. Includes product, DMA, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the DMA level.
22








Notes: Includes product, CBSA, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA
level.
Table 1.4: Demand Estimates and Elasticities
Estimates: κp Adj Ad−j λ(non-insulin) λ(insulin)
-0.0284 0.2269 0.1246 0.5063 0.5748
(0.0018) (0.0309) (0.0246) (0.0089) (0.0162)
Elasticities: η̄j η̄j(non-insulin) η̄j(insulin)
-2.135 -2.052 -2.218
(1.115) (1.214) (0.997)
Notes: N = 273, 046. Includes product, CBSA, year fixed effects. R2 = 0.8747.
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CHAPTER II
The Role of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising in
Negotiated Drug Prices
2.1 Introduction
High prescription drug prices have been a source of public concern in the
United States, particularly for essential drugs like insulin. The US is also one of the
only countries in the world that permits direct-to-consumer advertising (DTC) for
prescription drugs. What role might DTC play in the level of drug prices? This
question is theoretically ambiguous. Advertising that creates product differentiation
could increase drug manufacturers’ market power and raise prices. On the other hand,
advertising that is business-stealing could encourage consumers to substitute between
products and thus create greater competition.1 A key aspect of the prescription
drug market in particular that the previous literature has largely ignored is that
prices are negotiated between providers and insurers. Depending on how advertising
affects demand, drug manufacturers could gain bargaining power through product
differentiation, or insurers could gain bargaining power by playing different products
off of each other. Empirically, the effects of DTC on the supply side of the prescription
drug market are under-studied.
This paper studies empirically how DTC affects the prices of branded prescription
drugs and how the effect varies depending on the level of brand entry. I consider the
market for drugs used to treat Type 2 diabetes. This is a good setting to study
these questions due to the high levels of DTC, high prices, and recent brand entry.
I use Truven MarketScan’s medical claims data from the employer-sponsored health
1I will use the terms “DTC” and “advertising” interchangeably throughout the paper. See
Bagwell (2007) for a summary of the literature on advertising.
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insurance market and DTC data from Kantar Media. I focus exclusively on television
advertising in this paper, as that is the most important DTC channel for anti-diabetic
drugs. Beyond answering questions about advertising and drug prices, this market is
important in its own right due to the public health costs of diabetes (ADA, 2018).
To answer these questions, I start with a descriptive analysis of the marginal
effects of advertising on drug sales and prices. I run a series of two-stage least
squares regressions of drug prices on DTC using political advertising to account for
the endogeneity of drug advertising (Sinkinson and Starc, 2018). I allow both own
and rival ads to affect outcomes (i.e. I allow for spillover effects; Shapiro, 2018). I
find that advertising leads to lower prices on the margin. This can be explained by
business-stealing advertising making consumers more willing to substitute between
products – i.e. more elastic – which prevents drug manufacturers from charging high
markups. Thus, advertising is pro-competitive on the margin. I further find that this
effect is stronger when more brands enter.
However, the marginal effects of DTC are likely to be different from a ban on
DTC. To study this policy, I estimate a structural model of patient drug choices and
insurer-drug manufacturer bargaining over drug prices. I use the demand model of
Chapter I as an input into the bargaining model. The solution concept is Nash-in-Nash
bargaining. The model delivers four main results. First, I find that drug manufacturers
have a higher bargaining weight than insurers. Second, I show that allowing for price
adjustment in the counterfactual is important – average prices can look very different
when parties renegotiate. Third, I show that both of the mechanisms discussed above
are possible. There are equilibria where prices increase after a ban on DTC and
there are others where prices decrease. Finally, I show that a ban on DTC causes
new brands to lose significant market share, even after allowing for price adjustment.
This final result is robust to different kinds of equilibria.
This paper makes several contributions. First, I add to the growing literature
that studies interactions between firms in vertical chains, such as cable companies
and content providers (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Crawford et al., 2018) and
hospitals and health insurers (Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Ho and Lee, 2017). These
papers employ the Nash-in-Nash framework which has now become the workhorse
model to study price negotiations under a variety of counterfactual policies (e.g.
mergers). This paper is the first to study how DTC affects prescription drug price
negotiations.
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This paper also contributes to the literature on new drug entry, which has
largely focused on generics rather than brands. Frank and Salkever (1997) and
Ching (2010) show that branded drug prices can rise after generic entry. Grennan
et al. (2018) study the effects of a ban on detailing (i.e. marketing directly to
physicians) using the Nash-in-Nash model to endogenize price negotiations. However,
that paper does not study new brand entry as it examines a context (statins from
2011-2012) when major patents expired and prompted generic entry. Moreover, drug
manufactures’ detailing and DTC strategies can be quite different (Shapiro, 2018), so
it is important to understand both.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses institutional details of
the anti-diabetics market, Section 2.3 explains the data and descriptive analysis,
Section 2.4 introduces the structural model, Section 2.5 discusses the estimation
strategy, Section 2.6 shows results, Section 2.7 discusses counterfactuals, and Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 Empirical Setting
This paper focuses on the market for anti-diabetic drugs. These drugs are
largely used to treat Type 2 diabetes.2 There are three features of this market that
make it a natural setting to study the effects of advertising on prices and new products:
prices are high, several new brands have been introduced, and there is a high level of
advertising. For a detailed explanation of Type 2 diabetes, the market for treatments,
and employer-sponsored health insurance plans, see Chapter I. This section makes two
additional points that are relevant for the discussion in this paper.
First, in the market for DTC television advertising, firms buy advertising time
in an up-front market usually in the calendar year preceding when the ad will run.
The timing assumption for the structural model will reflect this fact.
Second, in the employer-sponsored health insurance context, employers generally
contract with insurance companies to administer health plans and negotiate with
health providers over terms of service (henceforth I will use “insurers” to refer to
this side of the market). In the pharmaceutical context specifically, insurers may
work with a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) to handle these negotiations. Rebates
2Type 1 diabetics can only use insulin. All of the other (non-insulin) drugs studied in this paper
can only be used by Type 2 diabetics. 90% to 95% of diabetes cases are Type 2 (CDC, 2017).
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from drug manufacturers to PBMs/insurers are an important feature of this industry.
Unfortunately, they are highly confidential. Like all other research in this area, I do
not observe rebates and assume they are held fixed in counterfactuals. In Section 2.7,
I discuss how I try to account for the bias rebates may introduce into the results.
2.3 Data
I utilize multiple data sources to answer the questions of interest. The period
of analysis is 2010-2017. Three main sources are used: prescription drug data from
the Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters database, DTC television
advertising data from Kantar Media, and political advertising data from the Wesleyan
Media Project. See Chapter I for a detailed explanation of dataset construction.
Truven contains data on medical claims for employees at a sample of large US
firms. For prescription drugs, the data show the national drug code number of the
drug purchased, the purchase date, the patient’s CBSA of residence, the patient’s
out-of-pocket price, and the amount paid by the insurer to the health provider net of
patient cost-sharing and third-party payments.
It is crucial that the observed price paid by the insurer is the actual reimbursed
amount rather than the list price set by the drug manufacturer (which almost no payer
actually pays) or a retail price that can be negotiated down. Having this information
is important for getting accurate estimates from the bargaining model and performing
counterfactuals (again, subject to rebates, which I discuss below). Unfortunately, the
data do not allow me to distinguish between different employers, insurers/PBMs, or
pharmacies. I therefore make two assumptions. First, I define a market as a CBSA
and assume each CBSA contains one insurer bargaining on behalf of all patients who
live there.3 Second, following Grennan et al. (2018), I abstract from upstream supply
interactions between drug manufacturers, wholesalers, and pharmacies and treat each
drug manufacturer as a bargaining unit in each market. However, the prices charged
by the manufacturer and those charged by the pharmacy should move in concert and
be highly related.
I link the claims data to advertising data from Kantar Media. Kantar provides
the number of local and national product-specific ads monthly at the Designated
Market Area (DMA) level. Figure 2.1 plots the total number of anti-diabetic television
3This could be the case if all employers in an area use a common PBM.
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ads and average negotiated anti-diabetic drug prices over time. Both series trend
upward and follow each other quite closely; while this fact is not proof of a causal
relationship, it certainly suggests that the link between drug prices and DTC is worth
investigating further.
As in Chapter I, I use the ad stock as my measure of advertising in all empirical
analyses (Narayanan et al., 2005; Shapiro, 2018). Let ajmt represent the number of






where τ is the first month product j advertised in market m and γ is a persistence
parameter rate. Following Narayanan et al. (2005), I calibrate γ to 0.7.
2.3.1 Reduced-Form Evidence
To account for the endoegeneity of advertising, I follow Sinkinson and Starc
(2018) in using political advertising as an instrument for pharmaceutical advertising.
The intuition is that political ads get preferential treatment and so displace other
kinds of ads exogenously in battleground states during election years. See Chapter I
for more details on the instruments.
In order to evaluate the marginal effects of advertising on prices in this market,
I run regressions of the negotiated drug price on DTC advertising by that drug and
by rival drugs:
ln(Pjmt) = βa ln(1 + Adjmt) + βs ln(1 + Ad−jmt) + αXjmt + εjmt (2.2)
Including advertising by rival drugs allows for spillover effects. I use as my price
measure the sum of the average patient out-of-pocket price and insurer net reimbursement
for each product-CBSA-year (the reasoning behind this measure is explained further
in Section 2.4).4
The first column of Table 2.1 shows results from an OLS regression of price on
own and rival ads. The positive coefficients are consistent with Figure 2.1. However,
4While it is possible that insurers negotiate a national drug price with drug manufacturers, in
the data I do see variation in prices across CBSAs.
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the two-stage least squares results in the second column show that a 10% increase in
own advertising decreases prices by 1.2%, while the same increase in rival advertising
increases prices by 0.61%. This shows that endogeneity is a real concern. The
difference between the OLS and 2SLS results suggest that drug manufacturers target
ads to high-demand markets, which would bias OLS coefficients upward. Prices in
these markets would be high anyway, but those prices would have been even higher
with less advertising.
The 2SLS results can be explained by advertising having a business-stealing
effect, as was found in Chapter I. Holding rival ads fixed, an increase in product j’s
advertising steals business from its rivals by making consumers more willing to switch.
The higher elasticity for consumers limits drug manufacturers’ ability to charge high
markups, which ultimately lowers j’s price. Conversely, holding own advertising fixed,
when rivals advertise, it steals business from product j. The positive price coefficient
could be explained by rival drugs using advertising to differentiate themselves, and
thus charging higher prices. Since prices are strategic complements, j’s price rises as
well. The reason that these effects are asymmetric has to do with the interpretation
of the coefficients – it is likely that an increase in advertising by one firm, holding
all rivals’ advertising constant, has a different effect than an increase in all rivals’
advertising.
To study whether these price effects vary with the number of entering brands,
I run the price regression separately on two subsamples of the data: periods of “light”
vs. “heavy” entry. Several drugs in my sample enter in and after 2014 (Table 1.1),
which is the year I use to delineate the heavy entry period. The 2SLS results are
shown in Table 2.2. The effects described above are concentrated in the period of
heavy entry (2014-2017) when there is more advertising, illustrating the interplay
between entry and advertising.
These price regressions, while illuminating, mask complicated competitive
effects of advertising. Moreover, a marginal increase in advertising could have different
effects from a total ban on advertising. To determine the effects of a ban, a structural
model is required.
2.4 Model
I estimate a structural model of demand and pricing for anti-diabetic drugs in
order to study the effects of a ban on direct-to-consumer advertising on drug prices.
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The components of the model include discrete-choice demand for prescription drugs
and bargaining over drug prices between drug manufacturers and employers/insurers
(see Grennan et al. (2018) for a similar approach).
The timing of the model is as follows:
0a. Insurers choose formularies and coinsurance rates.
0b. Demand and marginal cost shocks are realized.
0c. Drug manufacturers choose advertising schedules for the year.
1. Insurers and drug manufacturers negotiate over drug prices for the year.
2. Consumers choose drugs each month.
In the data, it is most common to see patients filling prescriptions for a 30-day
drug supply. However, it is highly unlikely that price negotiations happen at this
frequency. Therefore, an assumption needs to be made about how frequently prices
are negotiated. I assume that prices are negotiated at the beginning of each year. The
timing assumption for advertising reflects the fact that most advertising is purchased
well in advance of when it airs.
2.4.1 Demand
The demand model of Chapter I is used as an input into the bargaining model.
For the sake of coherence, some details from that paper are repeated here. Consumers
choose the prescription drug that maximizes utility. Consumer i receives utility from
drug j in market (CBSA) m, month t, and year y given by:
uijmt = βa ln(1 +Adjmt) +βs ln(1 +Ad−jmt)−ακjmypjmy +αj +αm +αy + ξjmt + εijmt
(2.3)
All terms are defined exactly as in Chapter I: Adjmt is drug j’s advertising stock (as
defined above), Ad−jmt represents rival drugs’ combined advertising stock in market
m and month t, κjmy represents the coinsurance rate for drug j in market m for year
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y, and pjmy is the negotiated drug price. By assumption, prices are negotiated and
coinsurance rates are set yearly. αj, αm, and αy are product, market, and year fixed
effects, respectively. ξjmt is a product-market-month unobservable, and εijmt = εigmt+
(1−λg)εijmt is a “nested logit” error. As is standard, I assume that εijmt is distributed
iid type 1 extreme value. The utility of the outside option j = 0 is normalized to
zero: ui0mt = εi0mt. I define the outside option as choosing a sulfonylurea.
It is convenient to define the mean utility of product j in market m at time t
as:
δjmt = βa ln(1 +Adjmt) + βs ln(1 +Ad−jmt)−ακjmypjmy +αj +αm +αy + ξjmt (2.4)














where Jgmt is the set of products belonging to group g in market m and time t.












1−λg sj|gmt − sjmt
)






, if j and k are in the same nest
ακkmtpkmtskmt, otherwise
(2.6)
where sj|gmt is the within-group share of j and sgmt is the share of group g. These
expressions show how advertising can have both product differentiation and pro-competitive
effects in this model. Looking at the own-price elasticity, advertising by j should
increase sjmt and sj|gmt, which makes consumers more inelastic and allows j to charge
a higher price. This is the product differentiation effect. Looking at the cross-price
elasticities, advertising by k should increase skmt, which makes consumers more likely
to substitute to k, leading j to charge lower prices. This is the pro-competitive effect.
The relative magnitudes of these effects are an empirical question and are not imposed
by the model.5
5The nested logit model does impose IIA within nests, which is perhaps not unreasonable because
of the lack of scientific consensus on the relative efficacies of these drugs (see Chapter I).
31
2.4.2 Bargaining
Drug manufacturers f ∈ 1...F maximize profit from the set of drugs j ∈ Jfmy





where qjmy is the quantity of j sold, and mcjmy represents marginal costs. This
formulation accounts for multiproduct firms. The quantity sold comes out of the
demand model through the relation qjmy =
∑
t sjmtMmt. Market size Mmt varies
exogenously and is defined as the number of prescriptions filled each month in a
given market. This is a reasonable definition because in the stage of treatment my
model focuses on, patients are beyond the point where diet and exercise alone (i.e.
no drugs) are effective.
Drug manufacturers negotiate with insurers over the “point-of-sale” price pjmy.
I assume that they do so through “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining. The two parties
maximize their joint surplus, which is split according to their bargaining weights.
The weights are normalized to sum to one. Consider a single manufacturer-insurer
pair in a given market-year (recall that the “insurer” is implicitly defined by the




b (Wmy(Jmy)−Wmy(Jmy \ Jfmy))1−b (2.8)
where Wmy(Jmy) ≡ CSmy(Jmy)−
∑
k∈Jmy(1− κkmy)pkmyqkmy, and b is a bargaining
parameter. Collard-Wexler et al. (2019) offer a microfounded interpretation of this
parameter as a discount rate in a repeated game. The party with the higher bargaining
weight is more patient and can therefore capture a larger portion of the joint surplus.
Note that these negotiations are over all products Jfmy drug manufacturer f offers
in market m and year y. The drug manufacturer takes into account how a particular
negotiated price for one of its drugs affects market shares and profits from its other
drugs.
The insurer balances patients’ consumer surplus from all offered drugs Jmy
against the cost of providing those drugs. I follow Ho and Lee (2017) in assuming
that employers fully internalize their employees’ welfare (which the insurers implicitly
take into account through their contracts with the employers). Consumer surplus
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This formulation, along with the timing assumption given above, assumes that both
insurers and drug manufacturers can forecast demand accurately when negotiating
prices at the start of the year. Insurers include “utility” from advertising in patients’
consumer surplus.
The Nash-in-Nash framework does not allow the set of agreements to change
when prices change. Like the previous literature, I assume that all agreements are
held fixed in the counterfactuals. This is consistent with the assumption that rebates
are held fixed. Industry analysts suggest that drug manufacturers use rebates to get
their drugs onto an insurer’s formulary.6 Since the analysis is “partial equilibrium”
in the sense that formularies will not change in the counterfactual, this restriction of
the Nash-in-Nash model is consistent with holding rebates fixed.
2.5 Estimation
Estimation of demand follows Chapter I. Berry (1994) shows that demand can









1{j ∈ g}λg ln(sj|gmt) + βa ln(1 + Adjmt) + βs ln(1 + Ad−jmt)
− ακjmypjmy + αj + αm + αy + ξjmt
(2.10)
where s0mt is the share of the outside option. I use separate nests for insulins
and non-insulins. Conveniently, this can be estimated with a linear IV. I use only
the CBSA-months that have at least 150 sales (including the outside option) to
reduce noise in the market shares. Because prices are assumed to be negotiated
yearly, I take average prices in the Truven data for both patients and employers at
the CBSA-product-year level. I impute coinsurance rates by dividing the patients’
out-of-pocket price by the total price for each CBSA-product-year. The out-of-pocket
price does not come entirely from coinsurance (e.g. there are copays as well), but this
6E.g. “...[PBMs] wrangle rebates and discounts from the manufacturers in exchange for getting
their drugs placed on the insurance companies formularies...” (Entis, 2019).
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formulation is able to capture any cost-sharing changes the insurer might make in
the counterfactual in a reduced-form way. If the price for a drug were to increase or
decrease significantly, the insurer might pass on a portion of that change to patients.
Chapter I explains in detail the instruments used for the endogenous variables
in the above equation: within-group share, out-of-pocket price, and advertising. To
summarize, I use the number of goods in each nest to instrument for within-group
share, the Hausman instrument for out-of-pocket price, and instruments based on
political advertising described in Section 2.3 for own drug advertising and spillovers.
It is worth saying more here about the political advertising instrument given the
timing assumption introduced in Section 2.4. For political advertising to be a valid
instrument in the context of this model, the identifying assumptions must be consistent
with the timing assumption. This implies that drug manufacturers (or the advertising
agencies they hire) must know the political advertising schedule when setting their
own ad schedules for the year. This is likely a good approximation of reality. Sinkinson
and Starc (2018) argue that the intensity of political advertising was a “surprise”
in 2008, but in my sample period, drug manufacturers would have observed what
happened in 2008 and adjusted to it. The Citizens United decision was made at the
beginning of my sample period, which should have further led drug manufacturers to
expect high levels of political advertising.
Though the model requires manufacturers to have predicted political advertising,
this does not threaten identification. What is important for identification is that
the timing and geographic variation of the political advertising exogenously shifted
pharmaceutical advertising from what it would have been had there been no election.
A drug manufacturer in 2011 that sets its advertising schedule for 2012 knows that
Ohio is likely to see a lot of political advertising, and so would adjust its advertising
in Ohio accordingly. The key is that 2012 being an election year and Ohio being a
battleground state are exogenous factors, so the drug manufacturer’s adjustment has
nothing to do with drug demand shocks in Ohio in 2012. Hence, the predictability of
political advertising is not an issue for identification.
After estimating the demand model, I make a few restrictions before turning
to bargaining. First, I consider only the CBSA-years for which the CBSA appears in
the data for all 12 months of that year (i.e. it meets the market size threshold in all 12
months). This is done to accurately model negotiations (which cover the entire year)
and to account for products that enter in the middle of the year. Second, I restrict the
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sample to the top 50 CBSAs by number of drug sales throughout the sample period
to ease computational burden. Third, I drop uncommon or unpopular products for
which it would be difficult to accurately estimate marginal costs.7 Dropping these
products also implicitly assumes that drug manufacturers only consider major rivals
in the bargaining game, which is plausible.
To estimate the parameters of the bargaining model, I take the first-order
condition of the log of the Nash bargaining problem presented above. The exposition
closely follows that in Gowrisankaran et al. (2015). There is a departure from that
model here in that demand decisions are being made monthly while price bargaining
is happening yearly, but it is straightforward to show that the FOC is of the same


















Collect the FOCs for a single manufacturer-insurer pair in a market-year:
q + Ω(p − mc) = −Λ(p − mc) (2.12)






for all j, k ∈ Jfmy. Rearranging, we get:
mc = p + (Ω + Λ)−1q (2.13)
Everything on the right-hand side of this equation can be constructed using data and
parameters. With the demand parameters in hand, marginal costs can be backed out
given any candidate value of the bargaining parameter b.
I now turn to the estimation of the bargaining parameter b. First, I parametrize
marginal costs:
mc = ηv + ω (2.14)
7Specifically, I drop products that have less than 1% market share in a CBSA-month or less than
0.1% of the total sales in a CBSA-year. The goal in choosing these thresholds is to balance dropping
products that may be one-off or unusual prescriptions with not dropping too many observations.
These restrictions drop about 10% of sales in the average CBSA-month.
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where v are product, CBSA, and year fixed effects. The shock ω will be used to form
a moment condition that identifies b. Inverting (2.14) and re-writing marginal costs
in terms of observables and parameters using (2.13) gives us:
ω = −ηv + mc = −ηv + p + (Ω + Λ)−1q (2.15)
Note that price is endogenous here because manufacturers observe the marginal cost
shock before choosing prices. But with an appropriate instrument z, the moment
condition E [ω ⊗ z] = 0 identifies b. The instrument I choose is consumer surplus
from the manufacturer’s products at the average out-of-pocket price of these products
in other markets (i.e. an analog of the Hausman instrument). This surplus is related
to the surplus that appears in the insurer’s agreement value because it is calculated
using the same demand parameters, but it should not be related to the marginal cost
shock in that particular market.
Because b enters (2.15) nonlinearly, it must be searched for. The Nash bargaining
problem is highly nonlinear, however; very small changes in the bargaining parameter
can drastically change the value of the objective function, which makes it very
important to try a lot of starting values. I use 901 starting values spaced evenly
from 0.1 to 1. I use a simplex routine with a tight tolerance on both the step size
and changes in the objective function to estimate b.8
2.6 Results
See Chapter I for demand estimates. Table 2.3 shows the estimates of marginal
costs and the bargaining parameter. Manufacturers have a larger bargaining weight
than insurers, consistent with the high prices observed in the data and noted by the
popular press. Mean marginal costs for a 30-day supply are estimated to be $191.
While production costs for drugs are generally thought to be low, distribution and
administrative costs could be playing a role here. Figure 2.2 shows that the model
fits the data reasonably well.
2.7 Counterfactuals
Given the demand, cost, and bargaining parameters, we can now simulate the
policy of interest: a ban on DTC. I allow both consumer choices and prices to adjust
8Results are robust to allowing b to vary by year.
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after the ban. I drop all firms’ advertising to zero and compute new equilibrium
prices and quantities using the FOCs. Upon doing this, I find that there is not a
unique equilibrium – prices can increase or decrease after a ban.9 Figure 2.3 plots
quantity-weighted average yearly prices for two representative equilibria, which I call
EQ 1 and EQ 2. In EQ 1, the price increase is concentrated in 2014-2017, which
coincides with the wave of new entry shown in Table 1.1. This result suggests that
entrants can use advertising to steal business and become better substitutes with
incumbents, creating stronger price competition. On the other hand, EQ 2 shows that
advertising can have a strong market power effect through product differentiation.
Figure 2.3 also replicates the “partial equilibrium” counterfactual (i.e. with no
price adjustment) from Chapter I for comparison. I again drop all firms’ advertising
to zero and use the demand model to find consumers’ new choices. This series in
Figure 2.3 shows that advertising creates a preference for more expensive products.
This effect is quite different, however, from both counterfactuals with price adjustment,
suggesting that upstream price adjustment should be considered when thinking about
a ban on advertising.
Figure 2.4 extends the results on new brands from Chapter I. The figure
shows that two entrants in the SGLT2 class would have had lower market shares
on average without the ability to advertise in both representative equilibria, showing
that the results from Chapter I are robust to allowing for price adjustment. Similarly,
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 extend results from Chapter I on spillover effects and outside
option shares; the main conclusion from both of these figures is that the results are
again robust to allowing for price adjustment.
To address the concern about rebates, I impose a uniform 12% discount on
the prices insurers pay for all products in all years and re-estimate the bargaining
model.10 Figure 2.7 shows average drug prices after a ban on DTC; the results are
qualitatively the same as above.
To get an idea of how the bargaining parameter affects these results, I re-run
the main counterfactual with b calibrated to 0.5, representing a symmetric position
for insurers and manufacturers.11 Figure 2.8 shows the results; again, both higher
9Second-order conditions hold in both cases.
10This was the average rebate in the employer-sponsored market in 2016 (Antos and Capretta,
2019). Rebates are not thought to affect patients’ out-of-pocket prices, so demand is unchanged.
11Given the non-linear nature of the problem and the difficulty of finding a global minimum
described above, this also serves as a robustness check for the main results.
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and lower prices are possible. Notice, however, that the price levels are lower than in
Figure 2.3 due to the higher bargaining weight of the insurer.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper is the first to provide evidence on the effects of DTC on negotiated
drug prices in the presence of new brand entry. I find that DTC can have both
pro-competitive and market power effects. Using political advertising as an instrument
for drug advertising, two-stage least squares estimates show that the marginal effect
of DTC is to lower drug prices through business-stealing. To study the effects
of a ban on DTC, this paper estimates a structural model of drug demand and
insurer-drug manufacturer bargaining. A partial equilibrium counterfactual shows
that DTC creates a preference for more expensive products. When prices are allowed
to adjust, both higher and lower average prices are possible, showing that accounting
for upstream price adjustment is important. In both cases, however, a ban on DTC
lowers the market shares of entrants in the new SGLT2 class. Taken together, these
results show that the supply side of the prescription drug market is important when
judging the effects of DTC.
There are several avenues for future research that could build on the results
of this paper. The issue of multiple equilibria should be studied further. This paper
made the assumption that formularies were held fixed in counterfactuals; allowing
insurers to choose formularies strategically would be a very important step forward.
This would not only permit a richer exploration of the effects of advertising, but it
would more fully capture the ways in which insurers can exert bargaining power.
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Figure 2.1: DTC and Prices, Anti-Diabetic Drugs
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Figure 2.2: Model Fit
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Figure 2.3: Average Drug Prices after a Ban on DTC
(a) EQ 1, prices rise
(b) EQ 2, prices fall
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Figure 2.4: Effect of DTC on Entrant Market Shares
(a) Farxiga, EQ 1 (b) Jardiance, EQ 1
(c) Farxiga, EQ 2 (d) Jardiance, EQ 2
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Figure 2.5: Effect of DTC on Non-Advertised Incumbent
(a) Humalog, EQ 1
(b) Humalog, EQ 2
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Notes: Rebates were simulated by reducing insurer prices by 12% and re-estimating the bargaining
model. The estimated bargaining weight is 0.90.
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Notes: Includes product, CBSA, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA
level.









Notes: Includes product, CBSA, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA
level.
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Airline Competition, Oil Price Pass-Through, and
Carbon Taxes
3.1 Introduction
Cost pass-through – the rate at which a cost change translates to a price
change – is an important concept in many areas of economics, ranging from industrial
organization (e.g., merger efficiencies) to international trade (e.g., exchange rate
pass-through) and public finance (e.g., tax incidence). In particular, energy cost
pass-through has important implications for environmental policy. In this paper, we
use the Australian airline industry to study how fuel cost shocks are passed through to
airfares and how the pass-through rate depends on the competitiveness of the route.
Airlines are an intriguing setting to study pass-through due to imperfect competition
and differentiated products, leading to the possibility of price discrimination. Furthermore,
from a policy standpoint, carbon dioxide emissions from the airline industry are
projected to grow rapidly (Tabuchi, 2019). This industry is therefore an important
part of the debate on strategies to address global climate change.
Fuel costs make up a significant portion of airlines’ total costs and could
potentially be passed on to consumers in the form of higher airfares.1 Additionally,
the level of competition on a route likely affects how much of the cost is passed
on. Pass-through in this context is important because the effect of higher fuel costs
should be equivalent to the effect of a carbon tax (Cullen and Mansur, 2014). The
pass-through rate we find could then help policymakers evaluate the likely effects of
a carbon tax on the airline industry. Finally, by evaluating how pass-through differs
1Fuel costs are 15-20% of total airline expenses (DOT, 2019).
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with the number of competitors on a route and the type of product, we can shed light
on the nature of competition in this industry.
This paper uses a novel dataset of Australian airfare data from Sabre Corporation
and schedule data from the Official Airline Guide (OAG). The airfare data are
monthly, an important advantage over the publicly available, quarterly Databank
1B US data. The schedule data tell us exactly which aircraft each carrier used on
each of its routes; we use this to construct engineering estimates of fuel costs that are
specific to each carrier and route in each month.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we estimate fuel cost pass-through
in an industry characterized by differentiated products and imperfect competition.
Importantly, we use aircraft engineering characteristics to construct precise fuel cost
measures at the carrier-route-month level. We find average pass-through rates in
excess of 100%. We also study how the pass-through rate varies by the number of
competitors on a route. Theoretically, the relationship could go either way. A simple
model of linear demand and constant marginal cost tells us that pass-through is 100%
in perfect competition and 50% for a monopolist. If we further assume symmetric
Cournot competition for the oligopoly case, pass-through rises monotonically from the
monopoly rate to the perfectly competitive rate as the number of firms grows. On the
other hand, other demand forms such as CES can have pass-through that is greater
than 100% and decreasing with competition. This is therefore an empirical question.
We find that pass-through increases with competition in the airline industry.
Second, we study whether pass-through varies by product. Because each firm
offers multiple products (e.g. non-stop vs. one-stop flights), there is potential for
pass-through to be different across products within the same firm. In fact, we should
expect this to be the case due to different demand elasticities for different products.
Specifically, we consider economy vs. business class flights and non-stop vs. one-
and multi-stop flights. We find that fuel cost pass-through is lower for business class
consumers relative to economy consumers on monopoly routes. By contrast, non-stop
flights have higher pass-through than one- and multi-stop flights. One interpretation
of these results is that they reveal a tension between differing pricing incentives.
On the one hand, airlines have a price discrimination incentive to distort prices for
“low-quality” products (e.g. economy class) more than “high-quality” products (e.g.
business class). On the other hand, standard pricing models show that markups
will be higher for relatively inelastic consumers; intuitively, we might expect that
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passengers traveling on non-stop flights are less elastic than passengers on flights
with stops. These results suggest that consumer heterogeneity and pricing incentives
of multi-product firms can explain our baseline results of pass-through that is greater
than 100% and increasing with competition. To our knowledge, this pattern of results
is novel in the pass-through literature.
In answering these questions, our paper contributes to several literatures.
A large literature in industrial organization studies market structure in the airline
industry (Borenstein, 1989; Berry, 1992; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Ciliberto and
Tamer, 2009). These papers estimate the impact of market dominance, entry, and
the threat of entry. Another strand of this literature considers welfare effects of
shorter-run decisions such as pricing, capacity, and codeshare agreements (Berry
and Jia, 2010; Armantier and Richard, 2008). Finally, there is a large literature
that studies how price discrimination varies with competition in the airline industry
(Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Chandra and Lederman,
2015). None of these papers consider fuel cost pass-through, which is an important
parameter for environmental policy.
There has recently been renewed theoretical and empirical interest in pass-through.
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) theoretically characterize several principles of pass-through
under different market structures. Their main finding in general cases of imperfect
competition is that pass-through depends crucially on the curvature of demand. Our
reduced-form analysis imposes little structure on the curvature of demand, so we
are not pre-determining pass-through with restrictive functional form assumptions.
Unfortunately, this also means we cannot formally say anything about welfare, since
in the Weyl and Fabinger (2013) framework this depends on both pass-through and a
conduct parameter. We view our work as complementary to papers that structurally
model the airline industry.
Our work also contributes to the empirical literature on energy cost pass-through.
Agrawal et al. (2017) use Weyl and Fabinger (2013)’s framework to estimate tax
incidence and competition in the US airline industry. Agarwal et al. (2014) find a
pass-through rate of 100% in the US airline industry using aggregate ticket prices and
fuel costs, but do not study heterogeneity or competition. Fabra and Reguant (2014);
Miller et al. (2017); and Ganapati et al. (2016) study energy cost pass-through in
homogeneous product industries (electricity, cement, and a subset of manufacturing,
respectively). All three studies find high rates. Ganapati et al. (2016) find a pass-through
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rate of 70% for manufacturing. Fabra and Reguant (2014) find that over 80% of
emissions cost shocks are passed on to electricity prices. Miller et al. (2017) find that
fuel costs are more than fully passed on to cement prices.
Some studies have examined the relationship between pass-through and competition.
Miller et al. (2017) find that competition reduces pass-through in the cement industry.
They explain this result using a symmetric oligopoly model with log-convex demand
based on Weyl and Fabinger (2013). Consistent with this, Ganapati et al. (2016)
compare several manufacturing industries and find that pass-through appears to be
greatest in the least-competitive industry they study. On the other hand, Cabral et al.
(2014) find that pass-through increases with competition in the Medicare Advantage
insurance market. Given that different studies have found different results, the
relationship between pass-through and competition is an empirical question. The
interaction between pass-through and price discrimination has been under-studied in
this literature.
Pass-through has also been studied extensively in contexts other than energy.
In the international trade literature, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) estimate a
structural model of the beer industry to explain incomplete exchange-rate pass through.
That paper studies a differentiated product industry, but only in a single market
(Chicago), whereas our setting allows us to use different markets to study how
pass-through varies with competition.
A separate literature at the intersection of industrial organization and environmental
economics finds that the welfare effects of environmental regulation can be quite
different from what standard models predict in imperfectly competitive markets
(Ryan, 2012; Fowlie et al., 2016). These papers consider the cement industry; by
contrast, we study the airline industry, which is also a major source of emissions that
are projected to grow rapidly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide
background on the Australian airline industry. In Section 3.3, we describe our data.
Section 3.4 discusses the empirical model. Section 3.5 presents our main results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Background: Australian Airline Industry
This paper focuses on the domestic Australian air market. Australia is a
particularly nice setting for our study because it is a relatively isolated country,
decreasing the potential for outside events to substantially influence it.2 Flying is
the obvious way to travel between many of Australia’s cities due to the lack of viable
alternative transportation options. Many highways do not have frequent rest stops
like those in the United States, and the rail network is much less developed than
Europe’s. Additionally, airline data are available at a higher frequency than similar
publicly-available US data.
Australia’s air market has two major full-service airlines – Qantas and Virgin –
as well as a set of regional competitors and low-cost airlines. The regional and low-cost
airlines have varying degrees of independence from the full-service airlines. While
some operate fully independently, others have been purchased by Qantas or Virgin and
become wholly-owned subsidiaries and/or are members of the same airline alliance.
The latter relationship allows cross-marketing of each other’s flights.3 Table 3.1 shows
each major airline’s market share during our sample period.
Jet fuel is a key component of airlines’ costs and can constitute up to 20% of
total costs (DOT, 2019). Jet fuel is a refined product that is made from crude oil.
Consequently, its price is closely tied to the price of crude oil. The ease of transporting
oil and its products means that prices are determined in world markets. World oil
markets are very thick and no individual participant can substantially affect prices.
We therefore treat jet fuel as an exogenous cost over which airlines have no control.
Australia introduced carbon tax legislation in 2011. The legislation was subsequently
passed and took effect on July 1, 2012. It was later repealed on July 17, 2014, but
the repeal was backdated to July 1, 2014. We will treat July 1, 2012 through July
1, 2014 as months that airlines were expecting to pay the carbon tax. While most
industries paid a tax of just under $25AUD/ton, jet fuel was taxed at 6 Australian
cents per liter. This tax was equivalent to roughly $21.50/ton of carbon.4 Due to the
fact that this carbon tax was relatively modest and short-lived, we elect not to focus
on it in our empirical work.
2By contrast, air travelers in the Netherlands have outside options at Dusseldorf Airport
(Germany) and Brussels Airport (Belgium).
3For example, one could purchase from Qantas a flight that is operated by Northern Air Cargo.
4This is within the range of estimates of the social cost of carbon, albeit at the lower end.
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Airlines have two primary ways to respond to changing jet fuel costs. Adjusting
airfares is the easiest and most flexible way – many airfares are changed multiple
times per week. Airlines can also alter their service offerings through the set of routes
that they offer and/or the frequency with which each route is offered. However,
this adjustment process generally takes considerably longer as airlines would have to
purchase access to gates. We therefore focus on airlines’ price responses to changing
fuel costs.
3.3 Data Description & Summary Statistics
Our airline price and passenger dataset was purchased from Sabre Corporation.
It consists of detailed monthly data for all domestic air travel in Australia from
2010 through 2017.5 The raw data are aggregated so that everybody who flew on a
given airline during a given month for an exact one-way itinerary in a cabin class is
combined. For example, all passengers who flew discount economy on Qantas from
Sydney to Perth via Canberra in January 2010 are grouped into one observation.
For each observation, we see the number of passengers and total revenue in the
month traveled rather than the month in which the ticket was purchased (we explain
below how we handle this constraint). The full sample consists of many routes with
inconvenient layovers and very few passengers. Consequently, we drop observations
where the airline has less than 1% market share for a route-month. These dropped
observations are likely not viable competitors for most passengers. Total fare data
are inclusive of all taxes, fees, and surcharges.
Airline schedule data were purchased from OAG. The data contain the complete
schedule of all domestic flights within Australia during our time period. We observe
the frequency, time, aircraft, and number of seats available for each route. Figure 3.1
shows capacity in terms of thousands of seats per day for the two major carriers.
We construct the average per seat cost of jet fuel (P JFirjt) for each carrier-route-product-month
by multiplying three terms together:
P JFirjt = P
Barrel
t ×Distirj × FuelEffirjt (3.1)
the average price of a barrel of jet fuel (PBarrelt ) in month t, carrier i ’s average fuel
efficiency (FuelEffirjt) in month t for product j on route r, and distance (Distirj)
5Having the universe of tickets vs. a subsample is another advantage of our data over the DB1B.
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for product j on route r.6 The average cost of jet fuel varies with all three terms
– different aircraft can have large differences in fuel efficiency, longer routes require
more fuel than shorter routes, and the price of jet fuel varies over our time period.
We now briefly discuss the source and construction of each term.
We collect daily jet fuel price data (PBarrelt ) from Platts (accessed via Bloomberg)
at the US Gulf Coast and average by month to match our ticket data. Because we do
not know the date each ticket is sold, we assume that the average ticket is purchased
one month in advance and therefore lag our fuel prices by one month. As discussed
above, because oil is traded on global markets, we assume that the Gulf Coast price
is a good proxy for the price Australian airlines face. Jet fuel prices ranged between
45 and 163 US cents per liter during our sample period. Figure 3.2 plots average
airfares and jet fuel prices. Both series are de-trended by year (to account for macro
trends) and month (to account for seasonality). Total airfare tracks jet fuel closely
for most of the sample.
Distance (Distirj) is one of the variables provided in our data from Sabre
Corporation. Distance varies across routes and across products within routes –
one-stop and non-stop itineraries will have different distances – and is an important
source of fuel cost variation. Figure 3.3 provides a graphical representation of the
variation from distance. The y-axis denotes the residual from a regression of jet
fuel costs on month-of-sample fixed effects, while the x-axis shows each observation’s
distance. Distance is positively and meaningfully correlated with our fuel cost estimates.
Finally, for each observation we assign an average fuel efficiency (FuelEffirjt)
based on the aircraft flying that route. Fuel efficiency data for each aircraft are
gathered from internet research.7 Fuel economy varies widely by type of aircraft.
Generally, larger aircraft use less fuel per seat-mile. Additionally, there can be large
differences within aircraft class. For example, the 98-seat Embraer E-Jet-190 uses 3.81
L/100km/seat while the 82-seat Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 uses 2.79 L/100km/seat.
We also adjust for the fact that seats in premium cabin classes (business and first)
take up more floor space in the airplane and therefore have a higher per seat fuel cost
(Bofinger and Strand, 2013).
6A route is a directional origin-destination pair, i.e. Sydney–Melbourne is a different route than
Melbourne–Sydney. A non-stop flight from Sydney to Melbourne and a one-stop flight from Sydney
to Melbourne are different products serving the same route.
7Wikipedia aggregates and cites estimates for many aircraft. Additional data are gathered for
aircraft not listed there.
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Table 3.2 summarizes our data at a slightly aggregated level: we combine
passengers with different intermediate stops and passengers in different cabin classes.
An observation is at the month-airline-route level (e.g., all seats on Qantas-operated
flights from Sydney to Melbourne in January 2012, including routes with stops).
Recall from the discussion in Section 3.2 that the two dominant airlines –
Qantas and Virgin – partly or wholly own regional airlines. In particular, Jetstar
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Qantas for the entire sample period. Consequently,
we treat any Jetstar flight as being operated by Qantas; it would not be accurate to
treat Jetstar as a competitor for Qantas because Qantas likely internalizes the profit
impacts of Jetstar’s pricing. Similarly, Tiger Airways was fully owned by Virgin after
October 2012; we therefore treat any Tiger Airways flight after that date as being
operated by Virgin.
Code-sharing is common in Australia, as it is in the United States. For the
purposes of estimating pass-through, we are interested in the identity of the operating
(rather than the marketing) airline because the operating airline is the one that makes
pricing decisions. Therefore, we calculate the number of competitors on a route, as
well as carrier fixed effects, based on the operating airline.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Specification
Our empirical strategy seeks to estimate the degree to which jet fuel costs are
passed through to airfares and how this relationship varies with competition. We
estimate various forms of equation (3.2) below. Our dependent variable (Airfareirt)
is the weighted (by passengers) average airfare for a given route (r), airline (i),
and month(t). For example, one observation in this specification is the weighted
average of airfares for all itineraries that traveled from Sydney to Melbourne on
Qantas during January 2010. This means that we aggregate across cabin classes and




irt +β3Compsrt×P JFirt +ωQt+δMt+Xrt+εirt (3.2)
On the right-hand side, we have the weighted (by passenger) average cost of jet
fuel for each carrier-route-month (P JFirt , aggregating P
JF
irjt), the number of competitors
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on a route (Compsrt), and the interaction of these two terms. Construction of the jet
fuel variable is discussed in Section 3.3. The number of competitors is calculated by
counting the number of airlines that have at least 1% market share and fly between
the origin and destination, regardless of the number of stops. When we investigate
heterogeneity across products, we disaggregate Airfareirt and P
JF
irt to the appropriate
level.
We expect β1 to be negative and β2 to be positive. The sign of β3 is ambiguous
ex ante, as seen by the mixed results in the existing literature. Our coefficients
of interest are β2 and β3. The average pass-through rate on a given route can be
calculated as β2 + β3 × Compsrt.
3.4.2 Identification
Because airlines typically sign long-term contracts with airports for gate access,
and air schedules are set far in advance, we assume that the number of competitors on
a route is fixed in the short run. While the number of competitors may be endogenous,
it will not vary endogenously with the price of jet fuel – it takes time for an airline
to change their route schedule and to enter new markets.
The price of jet fuel is determined in a world market and will not be affected
by Australian firms’ decisions. However, unobserved macroeconomic demand shocks
could make the price of jet fuel endogenous – if demand shocks increase both the
demand for air travel and the price of jet fuel, our estimate of the pass-through
rate would be biased upwards. To control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks,
we include quarter-of-sample (Qt) fixed effects. Demand for air travel is also highly
seasonal (e.g. during the summer and holidays), so we include calendar month (Mt)
fixed effects.8
Some specifications include a set of state- and route-specific controls (Xrt).
We construct the geometric mean of the origin and destination’s local government
area (LGA) populations, densities, and building values.9 We also use the average of
the origin and destination LGA’s net migration. We use the geometric mean of origin
and destination states’ population, wages, business expenditures, mineral exploration,
8We also include the monthly national unemployment rate as a more fine-grained control in some
specifications.
9An Australian LGA is roughly equivalent to a US MSA.
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and petroleum exploration.10 These controls will address route-specific demand and
cost shifts.11 We include origin and destination fixed effects and route fixed effects
in some specifications. In the most restrictive specifications with route fixed effects,
identification of our parameters of interest comes from shocks to jet fuel prices and
entry and exit within routes. This is similar to the identification strategy used by
Miller et al. (2017).
Our analyses are weighted by the number of passengers flying each route. We
take this approach because we are primarily interested in the major routes. Flights on
small planes that only run once a week are a small part of carbon emissions and may
not be broadly representative. Standard errors are clustered at the monthly level.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 presents our first set of primary results. The second row reports
the pass-through rate for a monopoly route, while the third row reports how the
pass-through rate varies with additional competitors. Our preferred specification is
in the last column, which includes the most restrictive set of controls and fixed effects.
The estimates show that pass-through in the presence of a monopoly is roughly 138%
on average, with each additional competitor increasing pass-through by 46%. These
estimates are relatively stable across all specifications. The sign on the coefficient
for number of competitors is negative in all cases, which is a useful sanity check
and indicates that our controls are doing well at capturing demand differences across
routes. As Miller et al. (2017) explain, a pass-through rate greater than 100% is
possible when there is a high degree of heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to
pay (WTP). The intuition behind this argument is that when costs increase, firms
abandon low-WTP consumers and price only to high-WTP consumers, leading to a
large price increase. Conversely, when costs decrease, low-WTP consumers enter the
market, leading to large price decreases. Intuitively, a high degree of heterogeneity in
WTP is a feature we would expect to find in the airline industry.
10The geometric mean is better than the arithmetic mean at capturing variation when locations
have very different values. For example, consider how the arithmetic and geometric means differ
for: a city of one million people and a town of ten thousand vs. a city of one million and a town
of twenty thousand. The arithmetic means will be nearly identical, while the geometric means will
be further apart. For airline demand, the latter is likely more informative. We use the arithmetic
mean for net migration because net migration can be negative, invalidating the geometric mean.
11Some states in Australia experienced a resource boom during our sample period, which is why
we control for mineral and petroleum exploration.
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Recall that the airfare variable we use is inclusive of taxes, fees, and surcharges.
To confirm that these factors are not driving our pass-through results, we re-run the
baseline regression with base airfare on the left-hand side. The results, shown in
Table 3.4, are very similar to the results with total airfare.
Table 3.5 reports results for non-stop flights and flights with stops.12 These are
differentiated products across which we might expect pass-through to vary. Indeed,
pass-through on flights with stops is 77% for a monopoly, with a 17% premium for
each additional competitor. For non-stop flights, however, pass-through is 133%, with
a 46% increase for each additional competitor. One interpretation of these results is
that passengers on non-stop flights are less price-elastic than passengers on flights
with stops, as we might intuitively expect. This set of results, then, is in line with
airlines’ incentives to price higher to relatively inelastic consumers.
The finding of a pass-through rate less than 100% which increases with competition
– as we find for flights with stops – is well in line with results found in the literature
and theoretically established by Weyl and Fabinger (2013). The result for non-stop
flights is more interesting. Miller et al. (2017) use the Weyl and Fabinger (2013) model
to argue that when pass-through exceeds 100%, it should decrease with competition.
In their context, they consider markets for a single product which serves both low- and
high-WTP consumers, but here, airlines target low- and high-WTP consumers with
different products. With more competition, some high-WTP consumers might choose
the “low-quality” good (here, flights with stops) as prices fall. This would leave only
the consumers with the highest WTP consuming the “high-quality” good (non-stop
flights), so pass-through increases with competition for these flights because airlines
are pricing to higher-WTP consumers. The logic is similar to why branded drug
prices can increase after generic entry (Frank and Salkever, 1997; Ching, 2010). This
argument relies on more airlines offering flights with stops as competition increases.
We test this prediction by regressing the number of airlines offering flights with stops
on the total number of airlines, controlling for the same factors as in our pass-through
regressions. Table 3.6 shows these results. The first column runs the regression at
the airline-route-month level and includes airline fixed effects. The second column
runs the regression at the route-month level. In both cases, there is a positive and
significant coefficient on the total number of airlines. Thus, more competition is
indeed associated with more non-direct flights, supporting the argument above.
12We drop distance controls from the non-stop regression with route fixed effects as these will be
collinear.
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Table 3.7 shows how pass-through varies for economy and business class seats.
We find that business class pass-through is lower on monopoly routes at 52% vs. 145%
for economy. Interestingly, this differs from the previous set of results if we consider
business class to be a “high-quality” product targeted to high-WTP consumers.
Following the intuition for the pass-through regressions with stops, it could be that
business class passengers are more price-elastic than economy class passengers. This
seems unintuitive since business class seats are generally more expensive, but certain
models of demand (e.g., logit) imply that elasticity increases with price. Another,
perhaps more likely, interpretation is that economy class passengers are low-WTP
consumers for whom airlines will distort price more in order to respect the high-WTP
business class passengers’ incentive compatibility constraints. In other words, airlines
are engaging in second-degree price discrimination through business class and economy
tickets, distorting economy ticket prices to steer high-WTP consumers to business
class. The fact that business class pass-through is much lower than economy class
only on monopoly routes, where airlines presumably have much more power to price
discriminate in this way, lends support to this intuition.
Consistent with the previous results, we find that ticket prices increase with
competition for both cabin classes. The fact that pass-through rates start converging
when there is more competition supports the idea that second-degree price discrimination
is harder without a monopoly. Economy pass-through might increase with competition,
however, because airlines still have an incentive to steer high-WTP consumers to
business class by distorting economy ticket prices.
3.6 Conclusion
We find that the pass-through of fuel costs to ticket prices in the Australian
airline industry exceeds 100% on average and increases with the amount of competition
on a route. While it is unusual to have both results simultaneously, they are possible in
this industry due to the presence of multi-product firms and heterogeneous consumers.
Supporting this idea, we find important heterogeneity in the pass-through rates for
different products, reflecting a tension between incentives to price higher to less elastic
consumers and to engage in second-degree price discrimination. From a public policy
standpoint, the results suggest that a carbon tax on the airline industry would be
over-shifted onto consumers.
In this paper, we have presented reduced-form evidence on heterogeneity in
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pass-through rates across different products and markets. Future work could take a
more structural approach and estimate demand for different consumer groups, as well
as airline pricing and capacity decisions, to better disentangle the various forces at
play. This would allow calculation of welfare changes due to changes in jet fuel prices
and a carbon tax. Overall, the results presented here underscore the importance of
taking industry-specific features into account when interpreting pass-through. The
effects of public policies like a carbon tax will greatly depend on pre-existing market
structure; intuition from simpler models will not always carry over.
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Figure 3.1: Seat Capacities by Carrier, 2010-2017
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Figure 3.2: Airfares and Jet Fuel Prices, 2010-2017
Notes: Airfares are averages across Australia for a given month. Jet fuel prices are from the US
Gulf Coast.
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Figure 3.3: Jet Fuel Costs and Distances, 2010-2017
Notes: This is a scatterplot of estimated jet fuel cost residuals and itinerary distances. Residuals
are calculated after regressing jet fuel costs on month-of-sample fixed effects. The orange line is a
line of best fit and demonstrates that the residuals are positively correlated with itinerary distance.
Distance is positively and meaningfully correlated with our fuel cost estimates.
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Notes: There are ten different airlines that operate with some degree of independence during our
sample. Qantas and Virgin are the major full-service airlines. Jetstar is a low-cost wholly-owned
subsidiary of Qantas. It competes with Qantas on many routes. Tiger was an independent low-cost
airline until 2013 when Virgin purchased 60% of the airline. Virgin purchased the remaining 40% in
2014. The other six airlines are regional players that focus on less-serviced routes.
Table 3.2: Air Travel Summary Statistics
Full Sample Non-Stop Flights
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Passengers 2695.64 10510.71 4390.74 11124.82
Average Total Fare (USD) 286.99 163.01 190.55 81.86
Average Fuel Cost (USD) 27.20 21.76 13.72 12.14
Distance (’000 KM) 1.73 1.27 0.76 0.65
Average Capacity Factor 0.69 0.12 0.70 0.15
Notes: Observations are at the month-route-airline level in the left two columns. For example, one
observation is all passengers that flew from Sydney to Melbourne in January 2010 on Qantas. There
are 112,965 total observations.
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Table 3.3: Regression Results: Baseline Pass-Through
O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -5.751∗∗∗ -5.818∗∗∗ -2.178 -4.236∗
(2.060) (2.114) (2.292) (2.460)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.454∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.178) (0.181) (0.196)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.557∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.109) (0.112) (0.100)
Thousand KM, Avg 29.504∗∗∗ 28.831∗∗∗ 49.106∗∗∗ 418.165∗∗∗
(2.517) (2.465) (2.885) (71.081)
Distance Squared -0.722 -0.676 -4.838∗∗∗ -93.383∗∗∗
(0.708) (0.688) (0.786) (17.996)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline FE No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No Yes Yes
Route FE No No No Yes
R squared 0.807 0.813 0.820 0.827
Observations 22688 22688 21921 21922
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level.
For example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in
January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is
required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at
the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the
number of passengers in an observation. Only the top 100 routes are included.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results: Baseline Pass-Through, Base Fare
Base Fare
Number of Competitors -3.799
(2.715)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.584∗∗∗
(0.259)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.444∗∗∗
(0.156)













Notes: The dependent variable is the average base airfare (not inclusive of taxes, fees, and surcharges)
at the month-airline-origin-destination level. For example, one observation is all passengers traveling
from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline
level, and at least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010
USD. Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month.
Weights are assigned according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only the top 100
routes are included.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results: Pass-Through by Stops
Stops Non-Stop
Number of Competitors -0.244 -4.153∗
(4.306) (2.473)
Jet Fuel Cost 0.770∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.193)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.167 0.461∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.102)




Quarter FE Yes Yes
Month-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes
Airline FE Yes Yes
State/Route Controls Yes Yes
Route FE Yes Yes
R squared 0.606 0.827
Observations 26449 21753
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-number
of stops level. For example, one observation is all non-stop passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only the top 100 routes are included.
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Table 3.6: Regression Results: Number of Airlines Offering Flights with Stops
Airline-level Route-level
Number of Airlines 0.341∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020)




Quarter FE Yes Yes
Month-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes
Airline FE Yes No
State/Route Controls Yes Yes
Route FE Yes Yes
R squared 0.659 0.745
Observations 21922 6723
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of airlines offering flights with stops on a route-month.
The first column is at the airline-route-month level, whereas the second column is at the route-month
level. At least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Standard errors are
clustered at the month level. Weights are assigned according to the number of passengers in an
observation. Only the top 100 routes are included.
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Table 3.7: Regression Results: Pass-Through by Cabin Class
Coach Business
Number of Competitors -3.514 -18.747∗∗∗
(2.367) (5.294)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.446∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗
(0.223) (0.240)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.416∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.123)
Thousand KM, Avg 332.579∗∗∗ 373.738∗∗∗
(71.926) (100.477)
Distance Squared -80.560∗∗∗ -14.202
(18.538) (19.132)
Quarter FE Yes Yes
Month-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes
Airline FE Yes Yes
State/Route Controls Yes Yes
Route FE Yes Yes
R squared 0.809 0.832
Observations 27444 14299
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-cabin
class level. For example, one observation is all business class passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only the top 100 routes are included.
70
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADA (2018). Statistics about diabetes. http://www.diabetes.org/resources/
statistics/statistics-about-diabetes. Accessed: Oct. 30, 2019.
Agarwal, S., Chomsisengphet, S., Mahoney, N., and Stroebel, J. (2014). A simple
framework for estimating consumer benefits from regulating hidden fees. The
Journal of Legal Studies, 43(S2):S239–S252.
Agrawal, D. R., White, Q., and Williams, J. (2017). Tax incidence and market power:
Evidence from the airline industry.
Antos, J. R. and Capretta, J. C. (2019). Assessing the effects of a rebate rollback
on drug prices and spending. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20190308.594251/full/. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2019.
Armantier, O. and Richard, O. (2008). Domestic airline alliances and consumer
welfare. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(3):875–904.
Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., and Cullen, M. (2015). Moral hazard
in health insurance: Do dynamic incentives matter? Review of Economics and
Statistics, 97(4):725–741.
Bagwell, K. (2007). The economic analysis of advertising. Handbook of industrial
organization, 3:1701–1844.
Bailey, T. (2013). Options for combination therapy in type 2 diabetes: comparison
of the ada/easd position statement and aace/ace algorithm. The American journal
of medicine, 126(9):S10–S20.
Berry, S. and Jia, P. (2010). Tracing the woes: An empirical analysis of the airline
industry. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(3):1–43.
Berry, S. T. (1992). Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry.
Econometrica, pages 889–917.
Berry, S. T. (1994). Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. The
RAND Journal of Economics, pages 242–262.
Bofinger, H. and Strand, J. (2013). Calculating the carbon footprint from different
classes of air travel. The World Bank.
71
Borenstein, S. (1989). Hubs and high fares: Dominance and market power in the US
airline industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 344–365.
Borenstein, S. and Rose, N. L. (1994). Competition and price dispersion in the US
airline industry. Journal of Political Economy, 102(4):653–683.
Braithwaite, D. (1928). The economic effects of advertisement. The Economic
Journal, 38(149):16–37.
Cabral, M., Geruso, M., and Mahoney, N. (2014). Does privatized health insurance
benefit patients or producers? Evidence from medicare advantage.
CDC (2017). National diabetes statistics report, 2017.
Chandra, A. and Lederman, M. (2015). Revisiting the relationship between
competition and price discrimination in the airline industry.
Ching, A. T. (2010). A dynamic oligopoly structural model for the prescription drug
market after patent expiration. International Economic Review, 51(4):1175–1207.
Chintagunta, P. K., Goettler, R. L., and Kim, M. (2012). New drug diffusion when
forward-looking physicians learn from patient feedback and detailing. Journal of
Marketing Research, 49(6):807–821.
Ciliberto, F. and Tamer, E. (2009). Market structure and multiple equilibria in airline
markets. Econometrica, 77(6):1791–1828.
Collard-Wexler, A., Gowrisankaran, G., and Lee, R. S. (2019). nash-in-nash
bargaining: a microfoundation for applied work. Journal of Political Economy,
127(1):163–195.
Crawford, G. S., Lee, R. S., Whinston, M. D., and Yurukoglu, A. (2018). The welfare
effects of vertical integration in multichannel television markets. Econometrica,
86(3):891–954.
Crawford, G. S. and Yurukoglu, A. (2012). The welfare effects of bundling in
multichannel television markets. American Economic Review, 102(2):643–85.
Cullen, J. A. and Mansur, E. T. (2014). Inferring carbon abatement costs in electricity
markets: A revealed preference approach using the shale revolution. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dalton, C. M., Gowrisankaran, G., and Town, R. (2015). Myopia and complex
dynamic incentives: Evidence from medicare part d. NBER Working Paper, 21104.
DOT (2019). What the cost of airline fuel
means to you. https://www.transportation.gov/
administrations/assistant-secretary-research-and-technology/
what-cost-airline-fuel-means-you. Accessed: Mar. 31, 2020.
72
Ellison, G. and Ellison, S. F. (2011). Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior
of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1):1–36.
Entis, L. (2019). Why does medicine cost so much? here’s how drug prices are set.
https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices-medicine/. Accessed: Jul. 20, 2019.
Fabra, N. and Reguant, M. (2014). Pass-through of emissions costs in electricity
markets. The American Economic Review, 104(9):2872–2899.
FDA (2015). The impact of direct-to-consumer advertising. https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/drug-information-consumers/impact-direct-consumer-advertising.
Accessed: Oct. 10, 2019.
Fowlie, M., Reguant, M., and Ryan, S. P. (2016). Market-based emissions regulation
and industry dynamics. Journal of Political Economy, 124(1):249–302.
Frank, R. G. and Salkever, D. S. (1997). Generic entry and the pricing of
pharmaceuticals. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6(1):75–90.
Ganapati, S., Shapiro, J. S., and Walker, R. (2016). Energy prices, pass-through, and
incidence in US manufacturing.
Gerardi, K. S. and Shapiro, A. H. (2009). Does competition reduce price dispersion?
New evidence from the airline industry. Journal of Political Economy, 117(1):1–37.
Goldberg, P. K. and Hellerstein, R. (2013). A structural approach to identifying
the sources of local currency price stability. The Review of Economic Studies,
80(1):175–210.
Goolsbee, A. and Syverson, C. (2008). How do incumbents respond to the threat of
entry? Evidence from the major airlines. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(4):1611–1633.
Gowrisankaran, G., Nevo, A., and Town, R. (2015). Mergers when prices are
negotiated: Evidence from the hospital industry. American Economic Review,
105(1):172–203.
Grennan, M., Myers, K., Swanson, A., and Chatterji, A. (2018). Physician-industry
interactions: Persuasion and welfare. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Guo, T., Sriram, S., and Manchanda, P. (2017). The effect of information disclosure
on industry payments to physicians. Available at SSRN 3064769.
Ho, K. and Lee, R. S. (2017). Insurer competition in health care markets.
Econometrica, 85(2):379–417.
73
Inzucchi, S. E., Bergenstal, R. M., Buse, J. B., Diamant, M., Ferrannini, E.,
Nauck, M., Peters, A. L., Tsapas, A., Wender, R., and Matthews, D. R.
(2015). Management of hyperglycemia in type 2 diabetes, 2015: a patient-centered
approach: update to a position statement of the american diabetes association and
the european association for the study of diabetes. Diabetes care, 38(1):140–149.
KFF (2017). Health insurance coverage of the total population. https://www.kff.
org/other/state-indicator/total-population/. Accessed: Oct. 10, 2019.
Miller, N. H., Osborne, M., and Sheu, G. (2017). Pass-through in a concentrated
industry: Empirical evidence and regulatory implications. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 48(1):69–93.
Narayanan, S., Manchanda, P., and Chintagunta, P. K. (2005). Temporal differences
in the role of marketing communication in new product categories. Journal of
Marketing Research, 42(3):278–290.
Raz, I. (2013). Guideline approach to therapy in patients with newly diagnosed type
2 diabetes. Diabetes Care, 36(Supplement 2):S139–S144.
Ryan, S. P. (2012). The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry.
Econometrica, 80(3):1019–1061.
Scott Morton, F. M. (1999). Entry decisions in the generic pharmaceutical industry.
The Rand Journal of Economics, pages 421–440.
Scott Morton, F. M. (2000). Barriers to entry, brand advertising, and generic entry in
the us pharmaceutical industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
18(7):1085–1104.
Shapiro, B. T. (2018). Positive spillovers and free riding in advertising of prescription
pharmaceuticals: The case of antidepressants. Journal of political economy,
126(1):381–437.
Sinkinson, M. and Starc, A. (2018). Ask your doctor? direct-to-consumer advertising
of pharmaceuticals. The Review of Economic Studies, 86(2):836–881.
Tabuchi, H. (2019). ’worse than anyone expected’: Air travel emissions
vastly outpace predictions. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/climate/
air-travel-emissions.html. Accessed: Mar. 31, 2020.
Telser, L. G. (1964). Advertising and competition. Journal of political Economy,
72(6):537–562.
Weyl, E. G. and Fabinger, M. (2013). Pass-through as an economic tool:
Principles of incidence under imperfect competition. Journal of Political Economy,
121(3):528–583.
74
